Abstract This paper uses a unique U.S. data set to analyze the demand for D&O liability insurance. This insurance protects managers mostly from shareholder litigation. Corporate insurance presents a much more different environment than individual insurance and calls for in-depth study of the reasons why corporation buy insurance at all. The hypothesis that D&O insurance is habit driven is rejected. Significant factors that influence the demand appear to be bankruptcy risk, financial risk, some aspects of corporate governance and alternative monitoring mechanisms over management. That confirms some well established theories about the decisionmaking on corporate insurance and the significance of risk management. Abstract This paper uses a unique U.S. data set to analyze the demand for D&O liability insurance. This insurance protects managers mostly from shareholder litigation. Corporate insurance presents a much more different environment than individual insurance and calls for in-depth study of the reasons why corporation buy insurance at all. The hypothesis that D&O insurance is habit driven is rejected. Significant factors that influence the demand appear to be bankruptcy risk, financial risk, some aspects of corporate governance and alternative monitoring mechanisms over management. That confirms some well established theories about the decisionmaking on corporate insurance and the significance of risk management.
I. INTRODUCTION
One aspect of corporate governance that has not received much attention is corporate insurance. Mayers and Smith (1982) report that corporations on the aggregate spend more money on purchasing insurance than on paying dividends (with numbers from 1976 and 1979) . There is a particular type of insurance that is directly related to corporate governance and the relationship between shareholders and managers. This is Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance, regularly purchased in the U.S. This insurance plays a significant role in the corporate structure and protects against the risk of managers not fulfilling their contractual obligations towards shareholders and other stakeholders in the company. This paper uses a unique data set from the U.S. to analyze the demand for Directors' and Officers' (D&O) Insurance and factors that explain the limits and retentions, thus enriching the relatively small literature on these important issues. It examines coverage limits in light of past stock performance, corporate governance and financial risk, using very recent data. The paper manages to confirm some theories on the demand for corporate insurance and refutes Boyer's (2003) contention that habit is the driving force behind it. This is only the beginning of the research and it will be substantially expanded for the conference.
The greatest risk directors and officers of corporations are exposed to is that of being sued. That risk is especially acute after the recent corporate scandals in America and the SarbanesOxley legislation of 2002. The importance of that risk is underscored by the fact that 93% of the US firms purchased D&O insurance in 1999 (Tillinghast-Towers Perrin). The Sarnanes-Oxley Act was introduced to increase the responsibility of managers and make it easier to prove wrongdoing in court. Directors and Officers can be held personally liable for the mishaps of the corporation, even though D&O liability can be also vicarious to the corporation. According to Tillinghast-Towers Perrin (2001) , 52% of the claims against public corporations come from shareholders (the rest are filed by customers, employees, clients, or the government). Shareholders may sue managers, when they have violated their fiduciary duty to the shareholders. The most common reasons that shareholders sue are related to corporate disclosure. The most common reasons that shareholders sue are related to corporate disclosure. Shareholder 3 lawsuits are ultimately a question of corporate governance. Good corporate governance should decrease or eliminate the incidence of such litigation. If shareholders are able to effectively monitor managers and managers' interests are well aligned with those of shareholders, there would be no reasons for litigation.
D&O insurance covers the financial loss of managers from settlements, judgments and defense costs in the case of lawsuits. Even if the managers prevail in court, there could be substantial defense costs. Most companies indemnify their directors and officers for these expenses under an arrangement, arising from the law or the corporate bylaws. Sometimes there are expenses that are not indemnifiable, however. There are typically three parts to a D&O policy (Mahan and McCorquodale 2003) . Part A pays directly to the Directors and Officers the non-identifiable expenses, covered by the policy, provided that they acted in good faith. Part B reimburses the corporation for the idemnifiable expenses they have paid to the directors and officers. In the 1990s part C, entity coverage, providing insurance to the corporate body, came into wider use. D&O insurance is not supposed to cover knowingly fraudulent actions. That issue is very sensitive now for insurers, when some have alleged such fraud on the part of the managers of Enron and other high profile cases. Contracts in D&O insurance are typically written on a claims-made basis. They cover claims made and reported in the policy year, even though the incident may have occurred earlier. This is quite appropriate for securities litigation, where a lawsuit may be filed years after the respective actions of the managers. Thus past behavior is very important in assessing the risk exposure of companies. Past behavior might provide clues as to whether claims may be filed against the company.
D&O insurance presents a very rich environment for testing economic theories for behavior under risk and contracting. As Mahan and McCorquodale point out: "No two D&O policies are alike" (2003) . Insurers custom make each policy for each company, taking into account its specific risk characteristics. That's an opportunity to explore what insurers perceive as risky and how they price it. It is also an opportunity to study whether companies and their directors and officers behave rationally in their purchases of insurance. . In a D&O insurance decision, the corporation typically decides how much coverage they need, while the insurer decides what risk the corporation poses and how to price the risk. And this type of insurance refers to an interesting risk, a risk that depends on the behavior of managers and their performance. It is not an earthquake risk that is entirely beyond their control. As the risk partially depends on their behavior and decisions, managers should be better able to assess their risk exposure and plan rationally. The theories described below explain what roles corporate insurance plays in mitigating bankruptcy risk, agency problems and providing real-services efficiencies and others. Rational managers would make their insurance decisions, based on these roles. On the other hand, not completely rational managers might use habit to guide their risk management decisions and thus behavioral explanations may apply. It is also important to understand why corporations buy insurance at all. Numerous theories exist about that, but they have been rarely tested due to the confidentiality of such data in the U.S.
II. THE ROLE OF CORPORATE INSURANCE
Why companies buy insurance has been a puzzle in the literature. The academic climate of the 1970s and 1980s, dominated by the capital asset pricing model and its derivates, supported the view that risk to a corporation gets passed to its stakeholders, notably its shareholders. Since shareholders can diversify their holdings, there should be no gain in corporate hedging of the risk. This view is challenged by explanations, relating to costly risks and transactions costs. A traditional explanation to buy insurance in economics is the risk aversion of managers and subsequently the effort of the companies to preserve the best human capital. As directors and officers are risk averse and litigation can lead to catastrophic personal losses, managers demand protection from such losses, if they are to serve in the company. In an effort to align the interests of managers with shareholders', managers are given part of their compensation in risky instruments, such as stock options or others related to company performance. Such compensation exposes managers to risk and they may desire a risk premium. Bankruptcy costs are another factor, influencing the insurance decision (MacMinn 2000) . In a bankruptcy, under the absolute priority rule shares become worthless and the creditors are the first ones to lay claims. Under financial distress, the company may find it difficult to indemnify directors and officers in the case of a lawsuit. Agency costs cause another problem. One of the problems that arises between shareholders and creditors is the under investment problem. Shareholders have some control over the company through their ability to appoint and compensate management. Creditors lend money to the company without such control over it. Thus shareholders may select projects with asymmetric payoffs to various groups of investors. This assumes that the managers have their interests aligned with the shareholders. Another agency problem that is more relevant to D&O insurance is the one between shareholders and managers. Mismanagement and misrepresentation of the situation of the company by self-interested managers, maximizing their own short-term income, may not be in the interest of shareholders. These are exactly the reasons that have increased litigation, filed by shareholders against directors and officers. And the personal and corporate account of managers here cannot be clearly separated as under the Fisher's separation theorem. Fisher's result (MacMinn 2000) shows that decisions made on the corporate account can be separated from decisions made on the personal account. When shareholders sue managers, however, they may go after their personal wealth. So managers may have to pay from the personal account for decisions they have made on the corporate account. That is where there is clearly a role for insurance. Others have advanced managerial opportunism as an explanation of the amount of insurance purchased (Chalmers et. al 2002) . This theory supposes that managers use inside information about the condition of the company to make insurance decisions.
Part of the theoretical background for those tests comes from Mayers and Smith (1982 , 1987 , 1990 . They identify the following factors that influence the corporate insurance decision. Higher probability of distress leads companies to purchase more insurance, as insurance decreases the expected cost of bankruptcy. Insurance also decreases the probability of loss, so companies with a higher probability of distress should have higher retentions. Smaller companies are more likely to buy D&O coverage due to real-service efficiencies and proportionately higher bankruptcy costs. Insurance is expected to eliminate the likelihood of under-investment by companies with growth opportunities, so they are expected to buy insurance. Substantial managerial ownership is expected to increase the likelihood of purchasing insurance because owner-managers are assumed to be more risk averse and possess less diversified portfolios. Rateregulated utilities purchase insurance and include the premiums in their rates, thus including the expected future losses in their rates and passing the costs to the consumers.
One reason this issue has not been studied more is that D&O insurance data are not publicly available in the U.S. That is why most studies rely on Canadian and UK data. The US represents a different environment than UK or Canada, as D&O purchases are private information in the US and thus reveal the behavior of Directors and Officers, when they are not publicly observed. Core (1997) was the first one to use Canadian data to analyze D&O insurance demand. Analyzing his sample of 222 firms, he concludes that the risks of lawsuit and risks of financial distress are major determinants of D&O insurance purchase. His goodness of fit, however, is quite low. In a later study, Core (2000) analyzes the premiums for D&O insurance, finding that premiums are explained by about the same factors as the ones, explaining D&O coverage. Using data on 366 UK companies, O'Sullivan (1997) finds that the same factors explain D&O purchases in the UK. He also concludes that executive stock ownership and D&O insurance are substitutes as corporate governance instruments. Boyer and Delvaux-Derome (2001) provide a more recent analysis of the demand for D&O insurance in Canada, using data from 1993-1999. Their explanatory variables are in five broad classes: corporation size, return characteristics, credit worthiness, litigation environment and corporate governance.
On the other hand, the stock price behavior of the company seems to be related to whether the company and its directors and officers will be sued. As Chalmers et. al (2002) observe "… declines in raw stock price performance often lead to shareholder lawsuits…" Further, Chalmers et. al (2002) find out a negative relation between D&O insurance limits and ex post stock performance. Notably, Chalmers et al (2002) is the only paper to my knowledge, using a U.S. data set. It consists of 72 firms, all of them IPO's, including their D&O insurance amounts, premiums and others between 1992 and 1996. As the authors point out, this a small sample (due to the fact that such information is not public) and probably subject to potential sample selection biases. The authors primarily examine the managerial opportunism hypothesis, according to which the amount of D&O insurance, bought by an IPO firm, is inversely related to the firm's ex post stock price performance. That indicates that managers use their superior information to assess the probability of exposure to legal liability. The authors use similar characteristics as in Core (2000) to find factors, normally influencing D&O insurance demand. They run crosssectional regressions of D&O purchase amount to IPO size, leverage, average avenue, standard deviation of these revenues, average operating income, standard deviation of the operating income, age of the firm, percentage of outside directors, among others. The variable of interest, long-run stock performance, appears to be negatively related to the amount of insurance purchased (Chalmers et. al 2002) . That holds for both raw returns and book-to-market and sizeadjusted returns. They interpret these results as consistent with the managerial opportunism hypothesis, provided we treat the three-year future returns as a proxy for managers' private information. One issue that Chalmers at al. (2002) may have overlooked is that D&O insurance is claims-based. Thus perhaps it does not matter so much what insurance IPO's had at inception; it is important what insurance they have at the time the claim is filed (this criticism is raised by Boyer (2003) ). Holderness (1990) suggests that corporate governance influences the demand of D&O insurance. D&O insurance plays a monitoring role in the relationship between management and owners. Insurance companies, on the other hand, play the role of monitors on the management, as they examine those to whom insurance is sold. A primary concern in governance is whether the interests of the managers are aligned with those of the owners. Some mechanisms to monitor the managers are having large shareholders (Schleifer and Vishny 1986) , boards of directors (Fama and Jensen 1983) , executive stock ownership (Jensen and Meckling 1976) , etc. Some literature suggests that D&O insurance and other monitoring mechanisms may be substitutes (O'Sullivan 1997) . According to the monitoring hypothesis, if the monitoring demand stays constant, companies will purchase more D&O insurance as the cost of alternative monitoring mechanisms increases (O'Sullivan 1997) . Holding the monitoring demand constant, if a company uses many alternative and effective monitoring means, then the demand for D&O insurance is likely to be less. Also, if a company employs effective monitoring, it is less likely to experience a lawsuit.
The board exists to protect and represent the interests of shareholders. The board hires and fires management, evaluates their performance and initiatives. Outside directors may be better able to exhibit impartiality and independence in their evaluation; inside directors, however, may bring more industry-and company-specific knowledge and expertise (Baysinger and Hoskisson 1990; Cadbury 1992) . Thus both classes might be valuable members of the board. Related to the independence is the issue of whether the CEO is also chairman of the board. Since the board has to hire and fire the CEO and oversee them, it would appear less than objective for the CEO chairman to oversee themselves. In Britain, the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (Cadbury 1992 ) has recommended separation of those functions.
Another view is that board composition and CEO-COB separation act as complements to D&O insurance (O'Sullivan 1997). As insurers act as monitors of corporate management, they may insist on more outsiders on the board and CEO-COB separation as a condition for offering coverage. Outside directors, in turn, may be more willing to sit on boards, if they are covered. Jensen and Meckling (1976) propose that having an ownership interest in the company aligns managers' interests with those of the shareholders. Then managers and directors will be owners who are involved in the decision-making. As insider ownership increases, Jensen and Meckling hypothesize that firm's value increases. Under such realignment of managers' and shareholders' interests there would be less demand for D&O insurance. In large companies shareholders are expected to use D&O insurance and managerial ownership as monitoring mechanisms. In smaller companies shareholders are expected to monitor through large ownership without the costly monitoring of D&O insurance.
Vafeas (2000) points out governance and ownership factors that distinguish corporations that have been sued and corporations that have not. He finds that outside block ownership plays a significant monitoring role, suggesting that outside blockholdings and shareholder lawsuits are substitute mechanisms. Vafeas (2000) reports that the likelihood of a lawsuit decreases significantly with the increase in blockholdings. External blockholders are seen as an additional mechanism that monitors managers and renders litigation less likely. Firms that have been sued appear to "have fewer unaffiliated blockholders holding less stock. . ." (Vafeas 2000) .
Based on the above arguments, here are summarized the reasons why companies purchase insurance. First, risk aversion makes managers demand protection of their wealth in the face of litigation risk. To attract high quality management, the corporation must provide better protection against catastrophic personal wealth losses.
Second reason are bankruptcy costs. Bankruptcy may carry substantial transaction costs, both direct, such as legal fees, and indirect, such as court administration of the firm's assets. Insurance shifts the risk to the insurer, decreasing the probability that the costs are actually incurred. In addition, being in financial distress, the company might not be able to indemnify its directors and officers for litigation costs, which is another reason managers may demand such insurance.
Third, agency costs may create under-investment or over-investment problems. The best studied agency costs are these between shareholders and creditors. Shareholders elect the managers, while creditors lend their money without direct control over the firm's decisionmaking. The managers might make decisions in the interest of one group that are detrimental to the other. Managers may reject investing in positive NPV projects (or downsize their investments), when the benefits go to the creditors and the downsides may go to the shareholders. That may make managers emphasize the downsides, resulting in under-investment. On the other hand, if the risks of a project are borne by creditors, managers may over-invest in risk projects, possibly even ones with negative NPV. If the risk is insured, managers might be able to better evaluate the merits of a project and avoid under-or over-investment.
Fourth, insurance and risk management companies are in the business of analyzing risk and they may be better suited than corporations to assess their risks. They can act as outside assessors of risk and recommend loss prevention and management programs.
Fifth, corporate insurance may alleviate the agency problems between shareholders and managers. Shareholders use a number of monitoring mechanisms to oversee the management, such as having large shareholders. Insurance is seen as an alternative monitoring mechanism. All the more, it involves insurance companies who act as outside monitors of the corporation. The insurer prices the coverage, based on the risk characteristics of the corporation. Thus here we have an objective outside monitor, which has a stake at the risks, posed by the corporation. This may indicate certain risks to the corporate managers, which they may have overlooked.
Sixth, the convex tax schedule makes corporations smooth their earnings to decrease expected tax liability (which is not the subject of this study).
METHODOLOGY
Since Martin Boyer (2003) finds that habit is the most important factor in explaining insurance limits, last year's limits will be included in the analysis. That makes for a model with a lagged dependent variable and explanatory variables (in this setting, dynamic panel data model). The usual OLS technique does work in this setting, because the strict exogeneity assumption is violated. The best technique to estimate such a model is the Generalized Method of Moments, developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) . Here the linear Arellano-Bond GMM first-differenced estimator will be utilized. (Taking first differences removes the individual effects.) The estimation equation is Limit i,t = Limit i,t-1 + X i,t +  i +  i,t where X includes the variables described above,  are unobserved individual effects, unchanged over time, the  i,t are assumed to satisfy E( i,t ) = E( i,t  i,s ) =0 for t  s. In other words, the errors are assumed not to be serially correlated, but not necessarily independent over time. The X i,t are allowed to be correlated with  i . In fact, in this case it is quite plausible that the explanatory variables will be correlated with the unobserved effects. Variables, measuring financial performance or corporate governance, may well be correlated with some firm effects, like the good character of the management. What instruments can be used depends on the relationship between the X i,t and  i,t . The possibilities are:
1. the X i,t are strictly exogenous. E(x i,s  i,t ) = 0 for s = 1 . . . t; t=2 . . .T. 2. the X i,t are weakly exogenous (predetermined). E(x i,s  i,t )=0 for s=1…t; t=2…T; E(x i,s  i,t ) 0 for s =t+1…T; t=2…T 3. the X i,t are endogenous. E(x i,s  i,t )=0 for s=1…t-1; t=2…T. E(x i,s  i,t )  0 for s=t…T;
t=2…T. In this case, I shall assume that the explanatory variables are strictly exogenous and see whether the Sargan test supports the hypothesis of valid moment restrictions. Then the instrument matrix is Z i = diag (y i1 . . . y is x i1 . . . x iT ), (s=1, . . ., T-2). The minimum number of observations I need per company is 3, T 3. This will further reduce the companies in the dataset. After testing, it appears that when including the stock returns, the Sargan statistic provides unsatisfactory results. Thus the stock returns will be treated as predetermined variables, 8 in which case the Sargan statistic allows me to accept the null of valid moment restrictions. For the predermined variable, we can use only the 0.5(T+1)(T-2) additional moment conditions E(x i,ts u it = 0, for t=3…T and 1 s t-1.
III.DATA
The data set consists of unbalanced panel data for U.S. companies for the years 1997-2003 and possibly earlier. In addition, my data set is not focused on IPO's but on a broad range of companies, allowing me to study factors, determining the general insurance decision and how it depends on corporate governance. I have obtained proprietary and confidential data from an insurance broker, which consist of about 500 US companies over the years 1998-2003, both private and public. Since this study focuses on the public companies, I removed the private companies from the set. After removing the private companies and those unlisted on Compustat or CRSP, the data set gets reduced to about 88 companies. To use certain panel data techniques, such as fixed effects, I need at least 2 observations per company and for the Arellano-Bond estimation I need at least 3 observations per company. After removing the companies with single observations, the data set reduces to 61 companies. Additionally, another provider has given me access to a larger set of D&O confidential data. The data include D&O insurance amounts, premiums, retentions, quote dates, effective dates, underwriters, SIC codes. This data set will allow me to analyze the demand for D&O insurance in the U.S. Having panel data allows me to study the dynamic decision-making between years regarding corporate insurance, while Core (1997) and O'Sullivan (1997) use cross-section data. To my knowledge, this is the first study, employing U.S. panel data set of D&O insurance data. It is also the first set on which the Arellano-Bond technique will be used. Additional data on other variables are coming from public sources, as needed. Financial information is collected from Compustat. Data on board composition and company ownership are collected from proxy statements and other SEC filings of the companies. Merger and acquisition data are collected from GSIOnline. Stock performance data are collected from CRSP. Numerous explanatory variables are being collected to provide for comprehensive tests of the insurance demand. Summary statistics for the variables appear below: As in Core (1997) , it is assumed that officers, directors, shareholders and insurers have symmetric beliefs about the probability and distribution of D&O losses. The insurer requires seeing the financial statements of the company before extending coverage. Misrepresentation on these financial statements may cause denial of coverage, as the company has misrepresented the risk they pose. This is becoming more common now, as insurance companies are more likely to deny coverage after the corporate scandals. The company chooses the limit it desires but the insurers have been raising substantially the premiums. The current market is described as a seller's or hard market. The litigation risk is perceived to have increased in recent years after the rise of lawsuits and corporate scandals. In response, the insurance companies have been raising premiums. Thus corporations need insurance at a time when it is pricey. It is important for companies to decide how much insurance they need. In such circumstances when insurers can charge higher premiums, premium loading is relevant. Boyer and Delvaux-Derome (2001) infer that proportional loading is important in D&O insurance. Basic insurance theory indicates that under proportional loading agents do not purchase full insurance but partial insurance is optimal.
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------

-------------+-------------------------------------------------------
Dependent Variables
The dependent variables I am trying to explain are the amount of insurance purchased (limit) and deductibles (more precisely, retentions). Their respective logarithms are used in the analysis (lnl, lnmaxret). Insurance policies typically include a number of retentions: securities retention is meant to refer specifically to loss, resulting from securities lawsuit; the personal retention (that has to be paid by directors and officers personally) is often zero; there can be another retention as well. One retention is paid per case, usually the highest relevant retention. Therefore the maximum available retention will be used for the analysis. The retention is the amount that the corporation and/or managers must pay before the insurance limit becomes effective. It is a sort of self-insurance. D&O insurance works in layers. The retention is the first layer, for which the corporation itself is responsible. Once it is covered, next are the primary and excess layers, provided perhaps by different insurers. It can be argued that agents choose as limit the highest possible loss. I have to include variables that explain the highest possible loss of a corporation from a lawsuit against directors and officers. But we have to remember that insurance is also increasingly costly.
Explanatory Variables
There are five groups of explanatory variables: Corporation size, Financial risk, Corporate governance, Habit and Long-term contracting.
Corporation Size
Size is an important factor in determining the litigation risk of a corporation. Size is measured by the following variables:
Ln (Market Value of Equity) (lnmve). Market Value of Equity (MVE) gives an indication of the size of potential settlement or judgment from a shareholder lawsuit. What a class of shareholders would have lost in a class period will be the difference between the true market value of their equity and the false value of their equity. I hypothesize a positive relationship between ln(MVE) and the limit (and retention).
Total Assets. Chalmers et al. (2002) find that IPO size is a major determinant of coverage purchased. The larger the company, the more employees, shareholders and clients it is likely to have. In addition, management of a larger corporation may be more complicated and require more tricky supervision. On the other hand remember the hypothesis of Mayers and Smith (1982?) : Smaller companies are more likely to purchase insurance, bankruptcy costs being higher for them, as larger companies are more diversified and may have other ways to control for risk. This, however, is more applicable to the retention.
Mergers and acquisitions are known to increase the litigation risk. Tillinghast-Towers Perrin (2001) reports that the U.S. survey participants with mergers, acquisitions or divestitures had more than twice as a high a probability to have a D&O claim. In addition, they experienced three to four times as many claims as those without mergers, acquisitions or divestitures, on average. Thus a dichotomous variable Acquiror (laga) is constructed, equal to 1 if the company had an acquisition in the past year and 0 otherwise. Another variable, Divestor (lagd), is equal to 1 if the company was acquired in the year, prior to the year of insurance purchase, 0 otherwise. The expectation is that presence of mergers and acquisitions increases both the limits and retentions.
Financial Risk Financial Distress. Financial distress is an important factor to consider, when talking about the ability of the company to meet its indemnity obligations to its directors and officers. The higher the financial distress, the more insurance the company is expected to carry, as its own funds will not be enough to indemnify the managers in lawsuits. Thus measures of financial health should be included in the regression. A measure, similar to the one in Boyer (2003) , will be used: Risk = -(Book value of assets/Book value of liabilities)*(1/volatility) Bankruptcy risk is expected to raise both the limits and retentions. This variable indicates the probability that a put option on the company's assets will be exercised at the book value of debt as a strike price. A proxy that measures bankruptcy probability is known to be the ratio of working capital to assets (solv). As this ratio is supposed to be negatively related to bankruptcy, it is actually a measure of solvency. The higher it is, the less insurance is expected to be demanded. Another measure of financial situation is Leverage (lev), measured as the ratio of long-term debt to long-term debt plus market value of equity. The higher this measure, the higher the risk of financial distress. Therefore, the higher would be the limits and retentions.
Volatility. Compounded daily returns are used to calculate annual volatility of the stock (vol), following Hull (2000) . Sharp declines of the stock lead to higher shareholder losses. Thus it is hypothesized that higher volatility leads to a higher level of insurance and retentions.
Growth company. The type of company, growth or value, may also influence the insurance decision. For growth firms future earnings are more risky and those companies involve more complex decision-making, increasing the probability of lawsuits. The variable to measure growth opportunities is constructed as the ratio of market value of equity plus the book value of liabilities to the book value of total assets (market-to-book ratio). It is hypothesized that this variable (growth) is positively related to D&O insurance and particularly retentions, since the probability of loss in increased.
Return on Assets (ROA). This measure of firm's profitability will be included. It is hypothesized that the higher the return on assets, the happier the investors, clients and employees. Consequently, the lower will be the litigation risk. Thus there will be a negative relationship to deductibles and limits. ROA is determined as the ratio of net income, excluding extraordinary items, to total assets.
Corporate Governance As D&O performance and insurance is argued to be related to corporate governance, measures of governance will be included:
The number of members on the board indicates how many people will be insured. The more members, the higher the potential defense costs, as every one will have a right to a lawyer. Thus the higher would the expected limits and retentions.
Percent of outsiders on the board of directors (pctout). Outsider is anyone who is not a chief executive officer (CEO), chairman of the board (COB), officer, employee or a member of their family. The hypothesis is that the greater the number of outsiders on the board, the better the supervision by the board on the managers. Potentially managers should be able to commit less misrepresentation. Thus less insurance will be needed. On the other hand, D&O insurance is part of the compensation package. Sometimes to attract high quality board members, the corporation may need to offer better risk protection. This supposes a positive relationship between the percent of outside directors and D&O insurance through the compensation role. The percent of insiders (pctin) will also be included, as sometimes insiders serve a valuable role on the board, as they are closely familiar with the business.
CEO=COB. The key positions are those of the CEO and COB. There are implications for the governance of the company when the same person serves in both positions. That decreases the independence and control of the board and supposedly creates conditions for misrepresentation and thus lawsuits. On the other hand, an argument can be made about the risk aversion of the CEO, who is also a COB. Boyer and Delvaux-Derome (2001) suggest that such a person is less risk averse than a person that holds only one of the positions. The implication is that the need for insurance decreases with the decrease in risk aversion. A CEO-COB, however, may experience less control over him and get involved in more risky investments, thus needing more insurance protection. Boyer and Delvaux-Derome (2001) also advance the argument that when CEO=COB, the number of directors and officers is smaller, reducing the severity of potential lawsuits. This variable (ceocob) is equal to 1 if CEO=COB and 0 otherwise. Some variables, measuring alternative monitoring mechanisms between managers and shareholders will be included. These are:
Directors ' and Officers' Stock Ownership (do) . The bigger the percent of stocks managers own, it is hypothesized that the less insurance is needed, as managers interests are more in line with shareholder interests and higher stock price. On the other hand, the risk aversion hypothesis suggests that the more stock directors and officers own, the more insurance they will demand. Thus the effect on limits and retentions is ambiguous. Large shareholders are supposed to monitor the management. The number of more than 5% external blockholders (numblock) and the percentage owned by such shareholders (pctblock) will be included. The higher they, the less insurance is expected to be needed and the lower the retentions.
Stock returns. Ultimately, shareholder litigation is a question of stock performance. Shareholder lawsuits are about investment losses investors have suffered, because of the poor stock performance of the company. Past stock performance may be one of the factors, telling managers how much insurance they need. Particularly, last year's performance may be in the mind of the managers, when they make the insurance decision. Thus one year returns for the year, ending the day before the inception of insurance, will be used. It is hypothesized that as returns increase, exposure to shareholder lawsuits decreases. This variable is trying to test what impact past stock performance has on the D&O insurance decision. Better stock performance is expected to be associated with lower limits and retentions. The buy-and-hold returns are measured as follows:
where T is equal to 356 calendar days to the day before the inception of insurance. If the stock was delisted from the particular exchange earlier than that, then returns only up to that date are used. Two measures of returns will be used. First, raw buy-and-buy returns (rawret)of the company will be utilized. Next, given the debate in the literature as to how to best measure stock performance, abnormal (abnret) returns will be calculated in the following way. All the companies in the CRSP database are divided into ten deciles in the respective periods, based on market capitalization (somewhat similar to the approach of Chalmers et al. (2002) ). Then the companies in my sample are assigned to their respective deciles, which will be their control portfolios. The buy-and-hold returns are calculated both for the control portfolios as a whole and the companies in my sample (for the necessary dates). The abnormal return is equal to the company return minus the respective portfolio return. The hypothesis is that the higher the stock returns, the lower the limit and retention.
Habit Formation Boyer (2003) concludes that the only significant variable, explaining the insurance decision, is habit or last year's purchase. None of the financial or economic explanatory variables appear to be significant. Habit tends to play a profound role in some aspects of human life. Smoking is one example. Campbell and Cochrane (1999) explain the equity premium puzzle through habit formation. They build on the observation that the marginal utility of consumers is very volatile when the consumption growth is low, so consumers need a higher risk premium. The fundamental observation in that and other models is that some people find it very costly to move away from a habit. Applying that fact in risk management, Boyer (2003) confirms it there as well. He accounts for managerial habit formation in the following ways. Managers make an optimal decision at a point in time and wait to see the results in the future. Waiting to see results may take years and during that time they stick to habit and may even delay evaluating the decision, if the outcome may be unfavorable. And if the outcome is unfavorable, changing the decision may mean admitting that one is wrong. And in corporate and power structures admitting that one was wrong is not a great thing to do. Thus one of the goals of this study is whether we can confirm or reject Boyer's hypothesis (that habit is the most significant variable) with these data.
Long-Term Contracts Insurance contracts vary from one year to three years. Having multi-year contracts may reinforce the habit effect, if it exists. Under such contracts, next year's coverage may be the same as this year's simply due to the contract (unless of course the company purchases additional coverage. To differentiate the habit effect from long-term contracting effect, a LongTerm variable will be included (similar to the one in Boyer (2003) , which counts the number of years, during which the contract remains unchanged. In the late 1990's, multi-year contracts were more common, as the market was doing well and insurance companies felt comfortable extending longer coverage. After the corporate scandals, that has changed. In the analysis, LongTerm will appear insignificant (plus there will be no habit effect to control for), thus will be dropped.
IV.RESULTS
The results from the Arellano-Bond estimation of the limit equation are shown in Tables 1  and 2 . In one estimation abnormal returns are used, in the other raw returns. The null hypothesis under the Sargan test is that the moment restrictions are valid and the model specification is correct. With the reported p-value, I accept the null. Next is the Arellano-Bond test for first order serial correlation, testing whether E( i,t  i,t-1 )=0. Under the null, there is no autocorrelation. (Arellano and Bond(1991) state that the lack of first order autocorrelation is not critical to their estimation method.)With the reported p-value, I accept the null. Note that the test statistic for second-order serial correlation is not defined here, because it requires min T5.
These results look very different than the ones obtained by Boyer(2003) with Canadian data. First of all, the lagged dependent variable is not significant. Thus the habit hypothesis is rejected here. The theory that habit is the driving force behind risk management decisions and other variables are ignored is rejected. Instead I have other variables that are significant at the 5% level or better: bankruptcy risk, volatility, CEO is same as COB, number of blockholders, solvency probability; the percent of blockholders is significant at the 10% level. The risk measure comes with the largest positive coefficient, strongly confirming the hypothesis that increased bankruptcy risk leads to higher limits. Thus financial distress emerges as a very significant determinant of the amount of insurance purchased. That solvency probability also appears with a significant positive probability is somewhat of a contradiction. Volatility is another important factor that comes with a positive coefficient, as expected. The dichotomous variable CEO=COB has a negative coefficient. That confirms one of the hypothesis, that when CEO=COB, less insurance is demanded. The explanations provided for that are that the person serving as CEO/COB is less risk-averse and also the number of people to be protected is smaller in that case. The significance of number of blockholders demonstrates that large shareholders do play a monitoring role in the corporation. The coefficient on that variable is negative, suggesting that the larger the number of shareholders, the better monitoring they provide over management, and the less is the need for insurance, as an alternative monitoring mechanism, as expected. The percent of blockholders (significant at the 10% level) appears with a positive sign, contrary to expectation. Apparently, having a larger stock share, owned by external shareholders, does not act as a substitute to liability insurance, while having more external blockholders acts as such. A higher number of blockholders are apparently perceived to provide better corporate monitoring. A larger percent of shares may be owned by one shareholder, who may collide with management and effectively be an insider. Thus a large percentage of ownership does not guarantee effective monitoring. To recap, the theories that are confirmed by the analysis are the role of bankruptcy risk, volatility, corporate governance in terms of CEO=COB and alternative monitoring in the form of number of blockholders.
The finding that bankruptcy risk is a major determinant of the corporate insurance decision is in unison with the findings of Mayers and Smith (1990) , focusing on the demand for reinsurance by property-casualty insurers. They conclude that the probability of financial distress is a major determinant in the reinsurance decision.
The results for the logarithm of the highest available retention as a dependent variable are in Tables 3 and 4 . In one estimation, raw stock returns are used, while in the other-abnormal returns. None of them are significant. Returns are once again treated as predetermined. The pvalue of the Sargan statistic indicates acceptance of the null hypothesis of valid moment restrictions. The hypothesis for no first order autocorrelation in residuals is rejected, but Bond and Arellano state that this is not critical for the estimation.
The insurance limits are typically chosen by the corporations, while the retentions are typically selected by the insurers. Retentions are meant to deal with small claims. Thus the probability of claims should mainly influence the retentions. A look at the retentions let us see how insurance companies view the risk of corporations they insure. Once again, the lagged dependent variable is not significant, destroying any hypothesis for role of habit. The variables, significant at the 1% level are: bankruptcy risk, ROA, CEO=COB. Significant at the 5% level are: growth (10% at second estimation), and members. At 10%, the significant variables are: ln(MVE) and Divestor. The bankruptcy risk emerges as the critical variable with the highest positive coefficient. Apparently, it is what insurers care for the most, when setting the retentions. They see it as the major determinant of the probability of claims. This variable captures important aspects of the financial heath of the company. CEO=COB appears with a negative sign, as was the case in the limits equation. It is a mystery that the return on assets has positive relationship to retentions. Theoretically the higher the ROA, the less the probability of claims. The growth variable, however, has the expected positive sign. The higher the growth opportunities, the higher the probability of claims. This is consistent with Mayers and Smith's hypothesis that growth companies, more likely to experience under-investment, will use insurance to eliminate it.
The coefficient on the number of board members is negative. Since the retention deals entirely with the probability of loss and not size of loss, this may be understandable. The higher the number of members, the higher the size of loss, but not necessarily the probability. In fact, a higher number of outside members may provide more effective monitoring over management, while a higher number of inside members may provide more expertise, thus decreasing the probability of claims. The relationship between ln(MVE) and retentions is negative. This actually confirms Mayers' and Smith's hypothesis that smaller companies will have larger retentions. Smaller companies have higher bankruptcy costs. The Divestor variable, measuring acquisitions the previous year, appears with a negative coefficient. That's surprising, given that mergers and acquisitions typically increase the probability of claims. CONCLUSION Boyer's (2003) contention that corporations make risk management decisions in this area entirely based on habit is rejected. I find that corporations and insurers use other factors to determine their exposure for the purposes of directors' and officers' insurance. They actually make decisions, based on financial and corporate governance variables. Chief among those are bankruptcy risk, volatility, leadership of the company, alternative monitoring mechanism for managers. Thus companies actually use some rational mechanisms to estimate risk exposure in the dynamic business environment of the U.S. This confirms some theories about the demand for insurance. Among those stands out the role of insurance to decrease expected bankruptcy costs. In addition, there is some evidence that liability insurance is used as a substitute monitoring mechanism over managers. The function of insurance to eliminate the likelihood of underinvestment in growth companies is confirmed in the selection of retentions. In the selection of retentions it is also reflected that smaller companies will higher probability of bankruptcy and thus higher retentions.
Some explanations for the sharp difference with Boyer's results would be: Boyer uses Canadian companies, while I use American companies. The litigation risk in the U.S being more present, perhaps corporation are more aware of the risks and take greater care to protect against them, rather than relying on habit. In addition, Boyer's sample comes from the years 1993-1998, while mine comes from [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] . In more recent years, corporate scandals have made companies more acutely aware of the litigation risk and they may have started to measure it, using rational approaches. The fact that bankruptcy risk, as measured here, figures prominently in the risk management decision is not surprising, given that it is based on information from the balance sheet and volatility, which are all too familiar to managers.
Using his results, Boyer concludes that corporate risk management is a waste of time. He does not find a role for it, neither in protecting human capital, nor to prevent under-or overinvetsment, nor to manage financial distress. Insurance decisions appear entirely a matter of habit. The results here are quite different from that. Risk management appears to play a valuable role in managing financial distress, investments and monitoring the management. Insurance companies do seem to play the role of outside corporate monitors. This paper shows some evidence for the usefulness rather than wastefulness of risk management. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- --Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions: chi2(10) = 8.15 Prob > chi2 = 0.6141 Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 is 0:
H0: no autocorrelation z = -2.54 Pr > z = 0.0110 .
